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RECENT DECISIONS
view which the Court of Appeals will take when the problem (involv-
ing torts of police officers) is ultimately presented, the result will be
that the state will be held liable. The latter eventuality would seem to
be the prospect in view of the prevailing trend away from the munici-
pal immunity."' At any rate, plaintiffs in such cases as this are not
altogether without hope of remedy. The Board of Estimate of the
City of New York may, in its discretion, make an award for personal
injuries or death caused by a police officer. 12
L. D. V.
TRAFFIC INFRACTION-PRIMA FACIE CASE OF UNLAWFUL PARK-
ING.-On fifteen different occasions an automobile, of which the defer-
dant was the registered owner, was found by police officers to have
been parked continuously for more than one hour in a congested, busi-
ness or residential street of New York City. Each of these occur-
rences constituted a violation of a regulation adopted and promulgated
by the police commissioner. The district attorney prosecuted these
traffic infractions in the Magistrates' Court. The defendant, in per-
unnecessarily to blunt the beneficient [sic] purpose of the waiver by the State
of its immunity."
"Duren v. City of Binghamton, 172 Misc. 580, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 518
(1939), aff'd, 258 App. Div. 694, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 518 (3d Dept. 1940).
22 N. Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 93d-3.0. The history of this section is most
interesting. New York City Local Law No. 13 of 1927 empowered the Board
of Estimate and Apportionment in its discretion to "make an award to a person
who has been or hereafter shall be ifijured by a police officer while such officer
is engaged in arresting any person, or in retaking any person who has escaped
from legal custody or in executing any legal process." Until after the death
had occurred in the case at bar, this law remained unchanged. It was held
constitutional in Matter of Evanis v. Berry, 262 N. Y. 61, 186 N. E. 203 (1933),
in which the court said: "The fact that the statute applies to persons receiving
injuries prior to its enactment is no objection to its validity." In 1934, by
New York City Local Law No. 16, § 246-a of the Greater New York Charter
prevailing at that time was adopted, and it extended the power of the Board of
Estimate and Apportionment to include cases of death caused by police officers
under the same circumstances as those set forth in. Local Law No. 13 of 1927.
Up to that time personal injuries exclusive of death had been covered by the
statute. The 1934 amendment further extended the power of the Board to make
awards in cases of death or injury caused by police officers while engaged in
endeavoring to make arrests. However, it required a unanimous vote of the
Board of Estimate as a condition to any award and in place of the words "in
its discretion," it used the words "as a matter of grace and not as a matter of
right." Except for a minor amendment to § 246-a of that Charter by New York
City Local Law No. 7 of 1936, which is not material to the present discussion,
the enactment remained unchanged until after the adoption of the latest Charter
in 1936. The new Charter contains no provision dealing with this matter. But
the Administrative Code of 1937 (Laws of 1937, c. 929), § 93d-3.0, as amended
by New York City Local Law No. 30 of 1939, provides that the Board of
Estimate, by a unanimous vote when the public interest will best be served, may
make an award against the city or any agency (of the city) upon any claim
certified by the comptroller to be equitable, but illegal or invalid.
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son, offered no evidence, but he contended: that the prosecution had
failed to establish a prima facie case against him; and that Section 435
of the Charter of the City of New York 1 was unconstitutional, ergo
the police commissioner had no authority to regulate parking, and the
magistrate acquired no jurisdiction. Held, that the defendant was
guilty of the traffic infracti6nis with which he was charged. People v.
Rubin, 284 N. Y. 392, 31 N. E. (2d) 501 (1940).
In scholastic fashion the defendant argued that from the facts
proved by the prosecution, iAz., that the defendant was the registered
owner of an automobile which had been unlawfully parked, one could
not infer that the defendant was a traffic infractor. Such an inference,
asserted the defendant, rebuts itself because, if a man were the regis-
tered owner of two or more automobiles which were unlawfully parked
simultaneously, since it is physically impossible for one man to operate
more than one automobile at one time, it could not logically be inferred
that the registered owner of two or more automobiles committed more
than one of such traffic infractions simultaneously. The court pointed
out that the evidence showed that the defendant owned only one auto-
mobile, therefore his reasoning did not apply to his own case. As the
defendant offered no evidence to refute the inference which was raised
against him, the inference prevailed.2 A rebuttable presumption,
similar to the rebuttable inference in question, exists in civil cases,a and
such an inference has been utilized in the criminal law. 4
Although it had previously been adjudicated a constitutional dele-
gation of legislative power,5 the defendant averred that Section 345 of
the Charter of the City of New York authorized the police commis-
sioner to regulate traffic, but not parking. The court decided, how-
ever, that the power to regulate traffic necessarily includes the power
to regulate parking, 6 hence the police commissioner was empowered to
.regulate parking by implication. 7  The defendant urged that the sec-
iN. Y. CITY CHARTER § 435 ("The police department and force shall have
the power and it shall be their duty to ... regulate, direct, control and restrict
the movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic for the facilitation of traffic
and the convenience of the public as well as the proper protection of human life
and health ... The commissioner shall make such rules and regulations for the
conduct of pedestrian and vehicular traffic in the use of the public streets,
squares and avenues as he may deem necessary ... The violation of such rules
and regulations shall be triable by a city magistrate and punishable by not more
than thirty days' imprisonment or by a fine of not more than fifty dollars, or
both.").
2 People v. Dyle, 21 N. Y. 578 (1860).
3 Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N. Y. 249, 108 N. E. 406 (1915) ; Piwowarski v.
Cornwell, 273 N. Y. 226, 7 N. E. (2d) 111 (1937).
4 Commonwealth v: Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N. E. 601 (1934); People v.
Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N. W. 248 (1938); People v. Marchetti, 154 Misc.
147, 276 N. Y. Supp. 708 (1934).
5 Cherubino v. Meenan, 253 N. Y. 462, 171 N. E. 708 (1930).6 People v. Lewis, 167 Misc. 139, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 508 (1938).
7 N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW Art. VI (entitled in part: "Provisions
9 Applying to Highway Traffic . . .") ; N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 86("Parking . . ." is part of the title, and § 86 is within art. VI).
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tion in question was unconstitutional, nevertheless, for it deprived him
of a trial by jury.8 In this respect the Federal Constitution does not
apply to trials in the state courts.9 The court by relating the New
York Constitution to the Vehicle and Traffic Law and the Penal Law,
clearly demonstrated that the defendant had not suffered any substan-
tial impairment of his constitutional rights.10
A. C. H.
UNEMPLOYMENT "INSURANCE - BENEFITS - DISTINCTION BE-
TWEEN AN EMPLOYEE AND AN INDEPENDENT CONTRAcTo.-This is a
proceeding in the matter of the claim of Margaret Morton against the
Spirella Co., Inc. for unemployment insurance benefits under the
Unemployment Insurance Law.1 Respondent manufactures and sells
made-to-order ladies' undergarments. Claimant was engaged as a
cors~tifre pursuant to a written contract which in part provided as
follows: the company agreed to grant an exclusive sales territory to
claimant, to give her the benefit of the company's training in corsetry
and salesmanship; to furnish her with the company's products at the
prices published in the company's wholesale price list, etc. By the
express terms of the contract, claimant was obligated to pursue respon-
8 U. S. CONsT. Art. III, § 2 (". . . trial of all crimes shall be by jury.");
N. Y. CONST. Art. VI, § 18 ("Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore
been guaranteed by constitutional provisions shall remain inviolate forever;
9 Eilenberker v. Plymouth'County, 134 U. S. 31, 10 Sup. Ct. 424 (1890).10 N. Y. CoNsT. Art. VI, § 18 ("Courts of Special Sessions and inferior local
courts of similar character shall have such jurisdiction of offenses of the grade
of misdemeanors as may be prescribed by law, and the legislature may authorize
them to try such offenses without a jury."); N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW
§ 2(29) (". . . no jury trial shall be allowed for traffic infractions.") ; N. Y.
PENA LAW § 2(6) (". . . traffic infractions . . . are not crimes."); Matter
of Cooley v. Wilder, 234 App. Div. 256, 255 N. Y. Supp. 218 (4th Dept. 1932).
2 N. Y. LABOR LAW § 502.
"Definitions. As used in this article:
1. 'Employment', except where the context shows otherwise, means any
employment under any contract of hire, express or implied, written or
oral, including all contracts entered into by helpers and assistants of
employees, whether paid by employer or employee, if employed with
the knowledge actual or constructive of the employer, in which all or
the greater part of the work is to be performed within this state....
But for the purposes of this article, 'employment' shall not include:
(1) Employment as a farm laborer;
(2) Employment by an employer of his spouse or minor child.
2. 'Employee' means any person, including aliens and minors, employed
for hire by an employer in an employment subject to this article,
except any person whose wages exceed three thousand dollars in any
calendar year." (L. 1935, c. 468.)
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